报告题目：Bubbly Bailout

报告人：董丰（上海交通大学安泰经管学院）

报告时间：2019年4月18日（星期四）上午10:30-12:00

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼318会议室

邀请部门：经济学系

主持人：刘钻石

 

报告人简介：

董丰于2014年获得美国华盛顿圣路易斯大学经济学博士，现为上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授，主要研究方向是宏观经济学、货币经济学、金融经济学与中国宏观经。在Journal of Monetary Economics(2篇)、Economic Theory(2篇)等优秀期刊发表论文多篇。

 

报告摘要：

This paper models and quantifies the optimal bailout policy for the systemic risk of bubble burst in an infinite-horizon production economy. Asset bubbles can provide liquidity to financially constrained firms, which then increases the dividends and the demand for labor, benefiting the households as shareholders and as workers. However, bubble booms may attract more resources to produce new bubbles and to save in bubbles, crowding out both capital accumulation and consumption. Moreover, bubbles are fragile subject to the market sentiment. Therefore the systemic risk of bubble burst causes both asset price volatility and economic fluctuations. In the presence of the trade-off, we examine the interactions between asset bubbles and government bailout policy in both steady state and transition dynamics. The tractability of the model allows us to analytically investigate the optimal bailout policy. We can also analyze the dynamic optimal bailout policy. In particular, should bailout policy be procyclical or countercyclical? Our quantitative exercise shows that it depends on the source of the shock.