报告题目：Non-Controlling Backward Shareholding and Input Price Discrimination（非控制向后持股与投入品价格歧视）

报告人：Romain Lestage（中央财经大学）

报告时间：2019年9月20日（星期五）上午10:45-12:00

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼318会议室

邀请部门：经济学系
 
报告人简介：
Romain Lestage博士是中央财经大学助理教授，巴黎第十三大学经济学博士，曾在法国和韩国从事博士后研究。他的研究领域包括产业组织理论、电信产业政策等，论文发表在《Journal of Regulatory Economics》、《B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy》、《Information Economics and Policy》等知名学术期刊。
 

报告摘要：
We study input price discrimination (IPD) based on non-controlling, backward shareholding and point out its differences with the other forms of third-degree price discrimination studied in the literature. We show that if downstream firms own non-controlling shares of a monopolistic input provider, the latter always discriminates against its shareholders, because backward shareholding reduces the elasticity of the derived demand for the input. Since the downstream firms that own shares of input providers set lower prices, IPD yields a positive consumption reallocation effect compared to a uniform input price. It follows that IPD based on non-controlling backward shareholding is more likely to improve welfare than the other forms of third-degree price discrimination studied in the literature, because a non-decreasing total output is a sufficient condition for welfare to increase. If the downstream firms operate in independent markets, this condition is satisfied if the curvature of the derived demand for the input decreases with backward shareholding. We also study downstream competition under linear demand systems. If the downstream firms compete in quantities, then IPD improves welfare if and only if there is a sufficient degree of product heterogeneity. If the downstream firms compete in price, then IPD always improves welfare, because it entails both a positive output and reallocation effect.