报告题目：How to Set a Deadline for Auctioning a House拍卖房屋如何设置期限

报告人：孟德隆（上海交通大学）

报告时间：2020年10月15日（星期四）上午8:30-10:00

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼218会议室

报告人简介：

孟德隆博士，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院助理教授，2019年获斯坦福大学经济学博士学位，主要研究微观经济理论、行为经济学、政治经济学。

报告摘要：

We investigate the optimal choice of an auction deadline by a house seller who commits to this deadline before the arrival of any buyers. In our model buyers have evolving outside options, and their bidding behaviors change over time. We find that if the seller runs an optimal auction, then she should choose a longer deadline. However, if the seller runs a second-price auction, then a shorter deadline could potentially help her. Moreover, the seller can extract information about buyers' outside options by selling them contracts similar to European call options. Finally, the optimal dynamic mechanism is equivalent to setting a longer deadline and running an auction on the last day.

Keywords: housing, auctions, deadline, dynamic mechanism design, information disclosure