报告题目：Acceptance Deadlines and Job Offer Design聘用通知书的答复时限与聘用合同的设计

报告人：赵昕（对外经济贸易大学）

报告时间：2020年11月12日（星期四）上午9:00-10:00

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼318会议室

报告人简介：

赵昕，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院助理教授，于2016年获得多伦多大学的经济学博士学位，主要研究领域为微观经济理论，政治经济学，以及行为与实验经济学。他当前的研究主要关注各种经济设计问题，包括聘用合同的设计、决策委员会的设计，以及委托人具有私有信息时的机制设计问题。 

报告摘要：

We study talent recruiting in an incomplete-information environment with the acceptance deadline of a job offer being a strategic recruiting device. When the terms of employment stipulated in an offer are invariable, increasing the acceptance deadline raises the chance of hiring the candidates anticipating more promising outside options, but reduces the probability of hiring those with less promising alternatives. The employer is more likely to extend offers with extreme deadlines, i.e., exploding offers, which require immediate responses, and open offers, which have the longest deadline, when the candidate always postpones his acceptance decision until the deadline. In any case, committing itself to a firm deadline is not optimal for the employer; allowing requests for a deadline extension benefits the two parties. When incorporating the acceptance deadline into job offer design, the optimal design can be implemented using a “bonus-for-early-acceptance” (BFEA) mechanism, which is widely applied in practice. In an BFEA mechanism, the employer (1) specifies a date that its offer expires, and (2) provides a salary bonus of accepting the offer, which is decreasing over time before the offer expires. A candidate anticipating a better outside option takes a longer time to respond and receives a lower bonus. Our result indicates that the differences in the BFEA mechanisms adopted in various real-world labor markets reflect the level of competition faced by the employers.