报告题目：Fee scheme competition: proportional fee and unit fee（收费模式竞争：按比例vs按单位）

报告人：古定威（复旦大学）

报告时间：2020年12月16日（星期三）上午10:00-11:15

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼318会议室

邀请部门：经济学系

 

报告人简介：

古定威，复旦大学管理学院讲师，于复旦大学管理学院获得经济学博士学位，曾于复旦大学经济学院从事博士后研究，研究方向为产业组织、纵向相关市场、平台经济和反垄断。他主持的研究项目包括国家自然科学基金青年项目、The British Academy Newton Fund。他的研究成果发表于RAND Journal of Economics，Marketing Letters，Pacific-Basin Financial Journal等国际权威期刊。

报告摘要：

We study the platforms' choice when they compete for merchants and consumers by adopting unit fee or proportional fee. We find that: if the merchant is monopoly, adopting unit fee is platforms' weakly dominant strategy; however, if there are multiple merchants compete in Cournot, they have individual but not collective incentive to join platform adopting proportional fee, which leads to proportional fee equilibrium; if the merchants compete in Bertrand, the merchant has both individual and collective incentive to join platform adopting unit fee, which results in unit fee equilibrium. Our findings shed light on platform entry and vertical integration/separation.