报告题目：Optimal royalty auction with seller’s post-auction investment考虑卖方拍卖后投资的最优特许经营权拍卖

报告人：徐欣毅（中山大学）

报告时间：2021年4月15日（星期四）上午8:30-9:30

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼318会议室

 

报告人简介：

徐欣毅 博士，中山大学岭南学院助理教授。2017年获香港中文大学经济学博士学位，研究领域主要包括契约理论、机制设计。

报告摘要：

We consider royalty auctions with each bidder’s payoff upon winning endogenously determined by his type and seller post-auction input. In charactering an optimal royalty auction mechanism, differ from standard approach, we first derive an upper bound value of seller’s expected payoff among all feasible mechanisms, then provide a mechanism which can obtain the upper bound value, called the optimal royalty auction mechanism. The optimal mechanism selects the bidder of the highest type among all participants provided that is greater than the threshold type, and recommends a post-auction effort as a function of the winner’s type. We show that first-price auction with full information disclosure rule can implement the optimal royalty auction mechanism.

 

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