报告题目：A Dynamic Matching Mechanism for College Admissions:

Theory and Experiment（大学入学的一个动态匹配机制：理论与实验）

报告人：龚冰琳（华东师范大学）

报告时间：2021年6月18日（星期五）上午10:00-11:30

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼318会议室

邀请部门：经济学系

报告人简介：

龚冰琳于2006年获得美国马里兰大学经济学博士学位，现任华东师范大学经济管理学部研究员、博士生导师、菁英班学术总监。曾在复旦大学和上海交通大学任教，并担任美国加州大学欧文分校梁仕源、梁秀莲中美商业和法律研究院兼职研究员、世界银行、亚洲发展银行顾问等职。她通过理论建模、实验和实证方法研究行为决策、机制设计、性别差异、信息经济学、行为金融等问题，论文发表在管理类国际顶级期刊Management Science和经济学国际著名期刊Games and Economic Behavior、Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Journal of Economic Psychology等上。2020年获高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖（人文社会科学）论文二等奖,2018年获得上海市哲学社会科学优秀成果奖学科学术奖论文一等奖。主持多项国家级、省部级和国际合作科研项目。荣获上海市领军人才、浦江人才计划、晨光计划、华东师范大学紫江青年学者、复旦大学卓学计划等人才计划支持。

报告摘要：

Market design has provided many managerial insights into why certain market institutions fail while others succeed in allocating scarce resources in both the for and non-profit sectors. In this paper, we analyze a new form of dynamic matching mechanism enabled by innovations in information technology. We provide a theoretical and experimental examination of this mechanism in the context of college admissions in Inner Mongolia, China, where students are given real-time allocation feedback and are allowed to revise their choices. Theoretically, we show that efficient and stable outcomes arise in every rationalizable strategy profile if there is a sufficient number of revision opportunities. Experimentally, we find that in an environment with high strategic complexity, the Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism performs better than theoretical predictions: It is as stable as the Deferred Acceptance mechanism and as efficient as the Boston mechanism, with higher truth-telling rate than both of them. These results suggest that the Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism can be a good substitute for static mechanisms in complex environments. The Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism may also be useful in matching potential employers and employees in the labor market.