报告题目：On two mechanisms in job rotation problems（关于工作轮岗问题的两个机制）

报告人：张永超（上海财经大学）

报告时间：2021年11月17日（星期三）上午10:00-11:15

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼218会议室

邀请部门：经济学系

报告人简介：

张永超，上海财经大学经济学院常任副教授，2011年获新加坡国立大学数学博士学位。主要研究领域为博弈论及匹配理论，成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory、Theoretical Economics、Games and Economic Behavior等期刊。

报告摘要：

We study the model of job rotation problems proposed by Yu and Zhang (2020), in which there may exist vacant positions or new employees, moreover, each position has been occupied by at most one agent and each agent occupies at most one position. In each occupied position, the occupant has the lowest priority while all other agents have the equal priority. This priority structure is the “opposite” to that of the classic model of house allocation with existing tenants. In this paper, we propose two intuitive and constrained efficient mechanisms in this model, one is the modified Top Trading Cycle (TTC) mechanism, the other is the modified You Request My House-I Get Your Turn (YRMH-IGYT) mechanism. Only in the case that there is no vacant position or new employee, these two mechanisms are both weakly group strategy-proof, moreover, they both coincide with the Backward-induction TTC mechanism proposed by Yu and Zhang (2020).