报告题目：Commitment and Compromise in Repeated Games

报告人：陈美晨（bat365官网登录）

报告时间：2021年11月25日（星期四）上午10:00-11:00

报告地点：bat365中文官方网站大楼210会议室

报告人简介：

陈美晨 博士，bat365中文官方网站讲师、奥利弗·哈特合同与治理研究中心研究员。2019年获圣路易斯华盛顿大学经济学博士学位，研究领域主要包括应用微观理论，博弈论，信息经济学。

报告摘要：

In this paper, we study two person infinitely repeated games in which players choose finite state automata instead of actions at each stage and at the end of each period there is a chance for each player to be committed to the prevailing automaton. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium in this repeated automaton game with commitment. The main result shows that the well-known folk theorem does not hold and we characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs under our constructions. In particular, we show that in a special class of symmetric games, provided that a small enough probability of commitment is fixed, the equilibrium payoff vector will be located in a small neighborhood of the symmetric Pareto efficient payoff vector as the players become sufficiently patient.

 

会后简报及工作论文请登录奥利弗·哈特合同与治理中心网站：

https://hartcenter.ecust.edu.cn/