报告题目：A Deduction Mechanism for Public Goods Provision: Theory and Experiment（公共物品供给的扣除机制：理论与实验）

报告人：郑捷（清华大学）

报告时间：2022年10月18日（星期二）下午1:00-2:00

报告地点：线上（腾讯会议448-813-390）

邀请部门：经济学系 

报告人简介：

郑捷，清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授，博士生导师。清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国圣路易斯华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士。清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任，清华大学互联网产业研究院产业学者。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编，Research in Economics副编，曾担任多份SSCI期刊客座主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和参照依赖、自我控制、互惠合作等行为问题，通过运用理论和实验相结合的分析手段研究不完全信息环境下的个体决策、多方博弈、市场均衡。主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题获“特优“评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。研究工作发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊，且有部分工作被收录入实验研究方法权威工具书Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology。

报告摘要：

We propose a simple commitment mechanism prior to a public goods contribution game. Each player simultaneously and independently proposes a deduction rate, which serves as a proposal for the rate by which the return on private investment accounts will be reduced. The group deduction rate is determined by the minimum level of the individually proposed rates. In the two-stage game with linear payoffs, the first-best outcome is achieved in the refined equilibrium, with a sufficiently high group deduction rate being chosen. The mechanism also improves efficiency for non-linear games. We conduct a laboratory experiment to empirically investigate whether and how our counter-intuitive mechanism works. The experimental findings highlight the importance of learning opportunities via examples. Even with repeated play, many subjects persist in choosing low deduction rates and therefore, welfare remains low. However, with exogenously given examples of group deduction rates, subjects learn quickly and achieve efficient outcomes when they later determine the deduction rates endogenously.