Labor Market Mobility: An External Governance Mechanism

主讲人：陆瑶（清华大学）

讲座时间：2022年11月1日（星期二）下午13：30

讲座地点：腾讯会议：445 807 643

主持人：叶志强 讲师

摘要：In this paper, we propose that a mobile labor market can impose pressure on firm managers and discipline them by pushing firms to compete for talent. Using the state-level staggered changes of noncompete agreement enforceability as the variation in labor market mobility, we find that restricting labor market mobility leads to less efficient executive compensation schemes and investment decisions. We apply the textual analysis approach to capture managers’ attention to employees and find that higher labor market mobility makes managers care more about employees. We also find that employee turnover causes institutional investors to sell firms’ stocks, supporting that labor market mobility imposes pressure on firm managers. Further evidence shows a positive link between labor market mobility and firm value. Heterogeneity tests show that the impact of labor market mobility is more prevalent in firms relying more on skilled employees and firms facing fiercer product market competition. The above evidence suggests that labor market mobility can serve as an external governance mechanism.

主讲人介绍：陆瑶，清华大学经管学院，教授(长聘)、博士生导师，金融系副主任。主要研究领域为公司治理，企业并购与重组，劳动与金融，技术变革对企业投融资以及发展的影响，资本市场改革与发展等。曾在国内外顶级权威学术期刊发表（或接收）论文44篇。其中，包括《Journal of Finance》，《Journal of Financial Economics》，《Management Science》，《Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis》，《Review of Economics and Statistics》，《Review of Finance》，《Journal of Corporate Finance》，《经济研究》，《管理世界》，《管理科学学报》,《金融研究》，《经济学（季刊）》等。她的多篇文章被哈佛大学公司治理论坛所收录。主要学术兼职包括担 任《Pacific-Basin Finance Journal》(SSCI)亚洲太平洋地区最主要的金融学学术期刊，副主编。担任《Corporate Governance: An International Review 》(SSCI)的编委会成员(Editorial Board）。主持纵向研究课题11项。